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CONSTRUCTIVE EXPROPRIATION
AND THE FRAMEWORK OF
DEFERENTIAL PROGRESSIVISM
I. INTRODUCTION
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms' (Convention) states that every person
and entity within a contracting State is entitled to basic property
rights.2 Such rights are not illusory and have been asserted in
numerous cases before the European Court of Human Rights
(Court).3  Most property rights litigation before the Court is
sparked by expropriations. 4  The term "expropriation" is
synonymous with eminent domain. Eminent domain has been
defined as "[t]he power of the nation or a sovereign state to take,
or to authorize the taking of, private property for a public use
without the owner's consent... 6 While not the most common
precipitant of expropriation litigation, constructive expropriation
is quite likely the most legally-problematic precipitant. Once this
cumulonimbus swells in its expropriatory firmament, it is usually
1. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter
Human Rights Convention].
2. Id. Protocol No. 1, art. 1.
3. See Subject Matter of Judgments Delivered by the Court in 1999, European Court
of Human Rights, at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/
SUBJECTMATTER_1999_TABLEeng.htm [hereinafter 1999 Judgments]; Subject
Matter of Judgments Delivered by the Court in 2001, at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/
EDocs/SUBJECTMATTFER_2001_TABLE.pdf [hereinafter 2001 Judgments].
4. See 1999 Judgments, supra note 3; 2001 Judgments, supra note 3.
5. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 442 (3d ed. 1969).
6. Id. at 398.
7. The modus operandi of constructive expropriations will be explored in detail in
the course of this article. It is helpful to begin contemplating the basic contours of
constructive expropriation, however. For now, it should suffice to point out that a
constructive expropriation is an expropriation that results from "the unlawful taking of
possession" upon the expiration of a set period of time or the fulfillment of a condition
precedent. Carbonara v. Italy, no. 24638/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI T 26.
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only a matter of time before legal scholars find themselves amidst
a wash of ostensibly-conflicting, juridical interests. Nevertheless,
as the Court demonstrates in Carbonara v. Italy, a contrapuntal
balance between such interests promises to lead the drenched legal
scholar to fair weather.
In Carbonara v. Italy, the European Court of Human Rights
examined the application of a common law constructive
expropriation rule that deprived landowners (Applicants) of their
land under Italian law. Both the constructive expropriation and a
retroactively-applied statute of limitations for expropriation
damage claims failed to meet "the requirement of lawfulness"
under the Convention.8  The Applicants' right to "peaceful
enjoyment of... possessions" 9 under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of
the Convention (Article 1) had thus been violated.
This Note examines the Court's decision in Carbonara v. Italy
and praises the decision as a foundation for deferential, legal
progression. Part II introduces the case, exploring its factual and
procedural background as well as its legal contours. Part III
provides a detailed inspection of the Court's decision. Part IV sets
forth the argument that the Court's decision in Carbonara v. Italy
properly struck a careful and crucial balance between national,
legal autonomy on one hand, and extrinsically-imposed, legal
stability on the other hand. In its narrow decision, the Court
created a deferential, yet persistent, paradigm of international
property protection through which arbitrary, domestic laws
eventually could be recognized and modified within the respective
contexts of the states that spawned them.
II. COUNTERCLOCKWISE: A CONSTRUCTIVE EXPROPRIATION
DILEMMA
A. Facts and Procedure
On May 27, 1970, the Town Council (Council) in Noicattaro,
Italy, received an expedited possession decree, authorizing it to
take informal possession of the Applicants' land for the purpose of
building a school. 1° The order expired two years from the date of
issuance. The Council was supposed to formally expropriate the
8. Id.
9. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1.
10. Carbonara, no. 24638/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI 6.
[Vol. 25:725
Constructive Expropriation
Applicants' land prior to the date of expiration so that the
Applicants could receive compensation." However, the school was
not completed until October 28, 1972, after the possession decree
expired. The Council never expropriated the Applicants' land
and the Applicants brought an action in the Bari District Court on
May 3, 1980.13 The Bari District Court held that while the
Applicants' ownership had been transferred to the Council upon
completion of the school via constructive expropriation, the
Applicants were entitled to compensatory damages for loss of their
land. '
4
On July 21, 1989, the Council appealed to the Bari Court of
Appeal. It argued that the Applicants were barred from gaining
compensatory damages by a five-year statute of limitations that
began running on October 28, 1972 and expired prior to the date
of the Applicants' complaint. 5 The Bari Court of Appeal ruled in
favor of the Council and the Applicants appealed to the Court of
Cassation on January 22, 1992.' The Applicants argued, inter alia,
that the retroactive application of a statute of limitations that had
only become legally applicable to constructive expropriation in
1983, unconstitutionally violated their property rights. The Court
of Cassation rejected the Applicants' arguments. Consequently,
on November 3, 1998, the Applicants lodged a complaint with the
Court, 7 alleging that the constructive expropriation rule and the
five-year statute of limitations, as applied in their case, violated
their Article 1 property rights. 8
B. Relevant Laws
Before delving into the Court's decision in Part III, it is
beneficial to examine the national and international laws relevant
to the Applicants' constructive expropriation case. A basic
understanding of relevant domestic law will help place
international legal issues within their appropriate contexts.
11. Id. T 7.
12. Id. T 9.
13. Id. TT 10-11.
14. Id. T 13.
15. Id. TT 15-16.
16. Carbonara, no. 24638/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI TT 16-17.
17. Id. T .
18. Id. T 45.
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1. Domestic Law
Under Italian law, upon the issuance of an expedited
expropriation order, local governments such as the Council can
take possession of private land before formally expropriating it.
The order cannot exceed five years, and it lapses if a local
government does not take possession of specified land within three
months of its issuance. If a local government takes possession of
private land under an expedited possession order, the land must
subsequently be formally expropriated so that the owner of the
land may collect expropriation compensation. 9 While formal
expropriation is required by statute where land is taken via an
expedited expropriation order, local governments may nonetheless
gain ownership of land taken pursuant to such an order through
constructive expropriation.
First emerging in the courts in the 1970s, the constructive
expropriation doctrine diverged in different evolutionary
directions.0 In 1983, a judgment by the Court of Cassation unified
the doctrine under a single constructive expropriation rule.2 In
Carbonara, the Court expounded upon the operations of the
constructive expropriation rule:
Under the rule, the public authorities acquire title to the land
from the outset before formal expropriation if, after taking
possession of the land and irrespective of whether such
possession is lawful, the works in the public interest are
performed. If, initially, the land is possessed without authority,
the transfer of property takes place when the works in the
public interest are completed. If the taking of possession was
authorised from the outset, property is transferred on the expiry
of the authorised period of possession. In the same judgment,
the Court of Cassation stated that, on a constructive
expropriation, the owner is entitled to compensation in full as
the acquisition of the land has taken place without title...
However, compensation is not paid automatically: the owner
must lodge a claim for damages... subject to a five-year
limitation period... [which begins from] the date the land is
2irreversibly altered.
19. Id. 19.
20. Id. 20-24.
21. Id. T 25.
22. Id.
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Land is "irreversibly altered, 23 at such time as a local,
governmental authority completes public works upon it.24 Thus,
through constructive expropriation, local governments could gain
title to private land by illegally possessing such land and
completing a public work on it. They could also gain title to
private land by continuing to possess it after the lawful period of
possession had expired. When assessing the constructive
expropriation process, it is important to consider the statute of
limitations that applies in expropriation cases.
Prior to 1983, no statute of limitations existed for
expropriation compensation claims. The five-year statute of
limitations for torts was only applied to expropriation
compensation claims as of 1983.25 It was the application of the
statute of limitations relative to constructive expropriation that the
Court in Carbonara examined against the backdrop of
international law.
2. International Law
The Applicants' challenge to the constructive expropriation
rule as applied in their case rested upon an assertion of Applicants'
property rights under the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Under the relevant provisions
of Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the Convention, individuals within the
Convention States are guaranteed "the peaceful enjoyment of...
[their] possessions., 26 Article 1 defines the relevant way in which
the "peaceful enjoyment of possessions" can be violated: "No one
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest
and subject to the conditions provided for by the law and by
general principles of international law."' 27 In order for a
government deprivation to violate Article 1, an applicant must be
"deprived" of property that was that applicant's possession.2
23. Belvedere Alberghiera v. Italy, no. 31524/96 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI T1 26.
24. Id. 25.
25. Carbonara, no. 24638/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI 26.
26. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1.
27. Id.
28. See Beyeler v. Italy, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 $ 105. See also Beate Rudolf, European
Court of Human Rights- Regulation of Cultural Property- Preemptive Right of State to
Acquire Works of Art- Compensation for Deprivation of Possessions- UNESCO
Convention on Cultural Property, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 736, 739-740 (2000).
20031
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If the applicant is deprived of a possession under Article 1,
the Court applies a number of judicial tests to analyze
circumstances and to determine whether the deprivation was
preliminarily "lawful., 29  While a preliminarily unlawful
deprivation results in a per se violation of Article 1,3 a "lawful"31
deprivation may still violate Article 1 if it fails to strike a justifiable
balance between the interest of the applicant and the public
interest in the deprivation.32
III. ELIMINATING THE BUGS AND PRESERVING THE LEGAL
INVENTION
A. The Bulwark
The Carbonara Court restricted the significance of its holding
to the application of the constructive expropriation rule in the
Applicants' particular case. The Court began its analysis by setting
forth the structural requirements of the relevant parts of Article 1:
'[T]he first rule, set out in the first sentence of the first
paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of
the peaceful enjoyment of property; the second rule, contained
in the second sentence of the first paragraph, covers deprivation
of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions... The three
rules are not, however, 'distinct' in the sense of being
unconnected. The second... [is] concerned with particular
instances of interference with the right to property and should
therefore be construed in the light of the general principle
enunciated in the first rule.'33
The Court thus made it clear that the second sentence of Article 1
elucidates the relevant requirements necessary for compliance
with the general guarantee of "peaceful enjoyment of possessions"
under the first sentence of Article 1. Sentence two of Article 1
states that "[n]o one shall be deprived of his possessions except in
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by
law and by general principles of international law. 34  In
29. Carbonara, no. 24638/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI 63.
30. Belvedere, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 62.
31. Carbonara, no. 24638/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI 63.
32. See Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 70-71.
33. Carbonara, no. 24638/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI 58.
34. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1.
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determining whether the application of the constructive
expropriation law violated the Applicants' rights to "peaceful
enjoyment of possessions" under Article 1, the Court assessed
whether the constructive expropriation had met the requirements
of sentence two of Article 1.
B. The Diagnostic
The Court first inquired whether the Applicants had been
deprived of a possession as defined by Article 1. If the Applicants
had not been deprived of a possession to which they were entitled
as contemplated by sentence two of Article 1, the Applicants
would not have grounds to bring suit on the basis that they were
deprived of "'peaceful enjoyment of possessions"' under sentence
one of Article L"3  Consistent with past precedent,36 the Court
concluded that a determination of whether the Applicants had
been subject to a cognizable deprivation under Article 1 had to
hinge on "the realities of the situation complained of. '37 Thus, an
informal deprivation arising from the combined effects of multiple
circumstances could constitute a cognizable deprivation of a
possession under Article 1. With this precept in mind, the Court
examined the circumstances surrounding the Applicants'
dispossession.
1. The Cogs of Dispossession
The Court found that for the purposes of Article 1, the
Applicants had been deprived of their possessions via the
application of the constructive expropriation rule in conjunction
with the retroactively-applied, five-year statute of limitations:
The Court notes that in the present case the Court of Cassation
held, in a decision that was final and in which it applied the
constructive-expropriation rule, that there had been a transfer
of property in favor of the Noicattaro Town Council; as a
consequence of that decision the applicants were deprived of
the possibility of obtaining damages. In those circumstances,
the Court finds that the effect of the judgment of the Court of
Cassation was to deprive the applicants of their possessions
35. Sporrong v. Sweden, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 35, 57. See also Holy Monasteries, 20
Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 56; James v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123, 37.
36. See Brumarescu v. Romania, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 862, 75. See also Sporrong, 5
Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 63.
37. Carbonara, no. 24638/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI 60.
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within the meaning of the second sentence of the first
paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. .38
Despite the Applicants' perceived inability to collect
compensation, the Council argued that the Applicants had been
compensated for their land in a prior settlement agreement that
compensated them for other expropriated lands. However, in light
of the land measurements listed in the agreement, the Court
agreed with the Applicants that the parcel number of the
contested land had been included merely by virtue of a
misnomer.39 Consequently, the Court found that the Applicants
had received no compensation for their land. In failing to
compensate the Applicants, the Council had deprived the
Applicants of the pecuniary value their land, a possession under
Article 1. After determining that the Applicants had been
deprived of a possession under Article 1, the Court proceeded to
determine whether the terms of the deprivation violated the
requirements of sentence two of Article 1.
2. Arbitrary Artifice
In order for a deprivation of a possession to comply with
sentence two of Article 1, as a threshold matter, such a deprivation
must meet the "requirement of lawfulness. , 40 However, sentence
two of Article 1 is vague in its definition of the lawfulness
requirement, stipulating that deprivations of possessions must be
"subject to the conditions provided for by law and by general
principles of international law.'" 4' Despite this ambiguity, the
lawfulness requirement has been interpreted by the Court with
specificity.
Although some scholars criticize the Court's asymmetrical
interpretation,42 the Court construes the lawfulness requirement
differently for parties who are nationals within an expropriating
country than for foreign holders of land within an expropriating
country. Deprivation of land belonging to foreigners must be in
38. Id. T 61.
39. See id. IT 36-44.
40. Carbonara, no. 24638/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI 1 64.
41. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1.
42. See Greta Gainer, Nationalization: The Dichotomy Between Western and Third
World Perspectives in International Law, 26 How. L.J. 1547, 1564 (1983).
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accordance with "the general principles of international law."43
Nationals such as the Applicants, on the other hand, are protected
by a lawfulness requirement that is composed of two elements:
[The] requirement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is that any
interference by a public authority with the peaceful enjoyment
of possessions should be lawful. The rule of law, one of the
fundamental principles of a democratic society, is inherent in all
the Articles of the Convention... and entails a duty on the part
of the State or other public authority to comply with judicial
orders or decisions against it... [T]he requirement of lawfulness
means that rules of domestic law must be sufficiently accessible,
precise and foreseeable.4
Accordingly, for a government deprivation of private possessions
to comply with Article 1, it must comply with domestic judicial
authority. That is to say, it must comply with the relevant domestic
rule of law. Under the lawfulness requirement, government
deprivations of possessions are also subject to extrinsic,
international assessment. The second element of the lawfulness
requirement mandates that such deprivations arise out of domestic
law that is "sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable. 45
Having established the dictates of the lawfulness requirement, the
Court deliberated on whether the Council's constructive
expropriation of the Applicants' land was in conformity with such
dictates.
The Court's decision as to whether the Council met the
lawfulness requirement under Article 1 when it expropriated the
Applicants' land pivoted on the facts of the Applicants' case.
46While the Council argued otherwise, the Court found that the
five-year statute of limitations for damages was only applied to
constructive expropriations as of 1983.47
The public works on the Applicants' land were found to have
been completed after the Council's possessory authority had
43. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1. See also James v. United Kingdom, 8
Eur. H.R. Rep. 123 59; Alfred P. Rubin, Book Review: Recuei des Cours de l'Academie
de Droit International de La Haye, 1982., 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 771, 15 (1987); Patrick M.
Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International
Law of Expropriation. 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474,475 (1991).
44. Carbonara, no. 24638/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI $ 63-64. See also Beyeler, 33 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 52 $ 109.
45. Carbonara, no. 24638/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI 1 64.
46. Id. 53.
47. Id. T 26.
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lapsed. The school, that is to say the public work, on the
Applicants' land, was completed on October 28, 1972, after the
Council's expedited expropriation order had expired.48 The
Council had thus gained ownership of the Applicants' land
through illegal possession. Because of such illegal possession, the'
Applicants were entitled to compensation.
Pursuant to the constructive expropriation rule as of 1983,' 9
the five-year statute of limitations for expropriation compensation
commenced on the date that the public work on the Applicants'
land was completed, it commenced on October 28, 1972. The
Court of Cassation's retroactive application of the 1983 statute of
limitations for constructive expropriation compensation claims
thus barred the Applicants from seeking and receiving
compensation for their expropriated land after October 28, 1977.
With these facts in mind, the Court proceeded to balance the
circumstances of the Applicants' case against the lawfulness
requirement of Article 1.
The Court noted some concern for whether the Council's
deprivation by way of constructive expropriation led to a violation
of domestic legal authority."' However, unlike the Court's decision
in Belvedere v. Italy,"1 the Court's decision in Carbonara did not
hinge on the first element of the lawfulness 2 requirement, but
instead on the second element.53  The Court's decision thus
centered on its determination of whether the retroactive
application of the five-year statute of limitations to the
constructive expropriation of the Applicants' land was "sufficiently
accessible, precise and foreseeable" under Article 1.
The Court noted that the Applicants' claim period expired
before the statute of limitations defining such a period even came
into effect in constructive expropriation cases such as the
Applicants'. Obviously the application of a statute of limitations
which had no bearing on constructive expropriations until 1983
was not foreseeable to Applicants in 1972. However, in rendering
its decision, the Court looked beyond the mere inception point at
48. Id. 9116.
49. Id. 25.
50. Id. 9 66.
51. Belvedere, no. 31524/96 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI.
52. Carbonara, no. 24638/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI 64.
53. Id.
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which the statute of limitations for tort damages was applied to
constructive expropriations.
Upon deliberation, the Court firmly found that the Council's
deprivation did not comply with the lawfulness requirement. It
reasoned that the Applicants only had certainty as to whether the
statute of limitations would apply when the Court of Cassation
rendered a final appeals decision in 1993: "The Court considers
that that situation could not be regarded as 'foreseeable' as it was
only in the final decision, the judgment of the Court of Cassation,
that the constructive-expropriation rule could be regarded as being
effectively applied. 5 4 Until the constructive expropriation rule
that was to apply in the Applicants' case was foreseeable and
precise, it was a fortiori not "accessible.""5 The Court thus found
that the constructive expropriation rule was applied in an
"arbitrary, 56 manner inconsistent with the lawfulness requirement
of sentence two of Article 1.
3. Recognizing the Fatal Flaws
As the constructive expropriation in the Applicants' case did
not meet the threshold lawfulness requirement of sentence two of
Article 1, under precedent,57 it was unnecessary to assess the
constructive expropriation by balancing the Applicants' specific
property interests against the public's interest in the
expropriation.58 As the lawfulness requirement of sentence two of
Article 1 was not met by the constructive expropriation, the Court
held that the Council's taking of the Applicants' land violated the
Applicants' "peaceful enjoyment of ... [their] possession ...
under sentence one of Article 1.
In rendering its decision, the Court generally acknowledged
the problematic nature of the constructive expropriation rule,6° but
54. Id. 69.
55. Id. 1 64.
56. Id. 72.
57. Id. 62. See also Sporrong, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 35 69; James v. United Kingdom, 8
Eur. H.R. Rep. 123 44; Beyeler, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 $ 107; Lithgow v. United
Kingdom, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 329 T 110.
58. Carbonara, no. 24638/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI 9$ 62. See also Holy Monasteries.
20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 T 70.
59. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1.
60. Carbonara, no. 24638/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI 1 64-66.
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confined its decision to the application of the constructive
expropriation rule in the Applicants' "instant case.'
IV. THE PLASTICITY OF DEFERENCE AND VINDICATION
The Carbonara Court rendered a proper decision that was
aptly wrought in its scope, substance, and tenor. In confining its
holding to the specific infraction before it, the Court did not
render a binding judgment as to the validity of Italy's constructive
expropriation law in the aggregate. The decision in Carbonara is a
well-crafted paradigm, receptive to individual needs, but
simultaneously deferential to the autonomous and progressive
evolution of domestic law.
In its decision, the Carbonara Court displayed the proper
deference for national law subject to international legal review.
National autonomy is an important facet of international law. The
philosopher Hegel writes that nations are the highest units of
authority, wholly subject to their own authoritative mandates:
'[S]tates are... in a state of nature in relation to each other,'
and for this reason there is no universal will binding upon them.
The 'rights of states are actualized only in their particular wills,'
in so far as there are no constitutional powers over them. There
62is no one to judge between states.
Although international law imposes some consensual, extrinsic
expectations upon the authority of nations, the quintessentially
autonomous nature of the national unit recognized by Hegel is still
paramount.
The quotidian legal, economic, social, and political dilemmas
faced by nations must be assessed and resolved by respective
national units. Such national units are uniquely qualified to
understand the hopes, fears, and aspirations of their national
citizens. Indeed, nations are the political units responsible for
passing laws in the interest of their citizens, and for the
enforcement of those laws. In short, it is the national unit which is
most qualified to create a legal framework by which its citizens will
be protected and its structural integrity preserved.
While nations should not be given unbridled discretion to
trample on the rights of their citizens, the national unit necessarily
61. Id. 69.
62. SAMUEL ENOCH STUMPF, SOCRATES TO SARTE A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,
337-38 (McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1988).
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deserves a great deal of deference when placed in the purview of
international law.63 The Convention is not devoid of national
deference:
Article 1 of the Protocol... acknowledges the police power of
the states, as a limiting provision on the rights of the
individual... [S]tates enjoy a large amount of discretion in
determining what actions fall within the police power. The
principle of state sovereignty is correctly given great weight by
the human rights principles, leaving determinations like
political, economic and social matters to the competence of
states.4
The Carbonara Court's decision recognizes the importance of such
national autonomy. The Court restricts its decision to the specific
application of the constructive expropriation rule in the
Applicants' case, and it refuses to pass binding judgment on the
general viability of the Italian law. Noting that the retroactive
application of the five-year statute of limitations to the
constructive expropriation of the Applicants' land involved
domestic law, the Court placed legal self-determination in the
hands of the Italian government.
In James v. United Kingdom, the Court examined domestic
laws aimed at socio-economic redistribution of private homes
through compulsory sales. In that case, the Court noted that there
was no basis for allowing for "the validity of [domestic laws to be
challenged for nonobservance of fundamental rights., 6) In dealing
with a law that was not per se violative of Article 1, based upon the
facts presented, the Court a fortiori properly refused to invalidate
the law as a whole under Article 1. The James rationale fortifies
the decision in the Carbonara case. As the constructive
expropriation rule was not "manifestly without reasonable
foundation" on the facts presented and as the laws of "a
democratic society... may reasonably differ widely," 66 it would
have been reckless for the Carbonara Court to have invalidated
the constructive expropriation law.
63. See James v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123 46.
64. Jon A. Stanley, Keeping Big Brother Out of Our Backyard: Regulatory Takings as
Defined in International Law and Compared to American Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence,
15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 349, 382-84.
65. James v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123 85. See also Holy Monasteries,
20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 1 90.
66. James v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123 46.
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The Carbonara Court's decision allowed the Italian
government to direct the development of its own law in a manner
that was not only optimal for isolated individuals, but also for
"individuals kwho] are rooted in, and part of, larger
communities." The national unit, as the aggregate of such
communities, is best suited to apprehend communal needs and to
tailor apt legal solutions to fulfill such needs. If the Court
invalidated the constructive expropriation law on the facts in
Carbonara, it would have substituted its "its own conception of
what was in the public interest" 68 in place of the discretionary
authority of national judges who were uniquely qualified to define
national law. In abstaining from an invalidation of Italy's
constructive expropriation law, the Court's decision allowed
national law to evolve within a national context but also informed
the domestic government of an inequitable law. While the
Carbonara decision did not invalidate Italy's domestic law of
constructive expropriation, the decision provided a mechanism
through which individual interests were vindicated and domestic
legal progression was catalyzed.
Through its restricted, binding effect and its dicta, the
Carbonara Court's decision ensured that individual rights were
protected and helped to expedite the progressive development of
domestic law. In invalidating the application of the constructive
expropriation rule in the Applicant's specific case, the Court
provided for the vindication of individual human rights,
irrespective of whether domestic law had been properly refined.
In so doing, the Court afforded protection to individual rights
during a period of incomplete, domestic, legal evolution. Not only
did the Carbonara Court's decision protect individual human
rights from the trespasses of evolving, domestic law, it also helped
to progressively inform the evolution of domestic law.
The Court properly refused to invalidate or to reconstitute
Italy's constructive expropriation rule as a general body of law.
The Court did note the troublesome nature of the general rule,
however:
The Court observes that the case-law on constructive
67. Michael R. Antinori, Does Lochner Live in Luxembourg?: An Analysis of the
Property Rights Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1778, 1785 (1995).
68. Id. at 1821.
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expropriations has evolved in a way that has led to the rule
being applied inconsistently.., a factor which could result in
unforeseeable or arbitrary outcomes and deprive litigants of
effective protection of their rights and which, as a consequence,
is inconsistent with the requirement of lawfulness... The Court
has reservations as to the compatibility with the requirement of
lawfulness of a mechanism which, generally, enables the
authorities to benefit from an unlawful situation...69
While the Court's statements are dicta, such statements issued in
conjunction with a circumstantial invalidation of constructive
expropriation are not devoid of instructive puissance. Through its
criticism of the constructive expropriation rule and its invalidation
of a telling instance of the rule's application, the Court helped to
clarify the potential problems associated with the Italian
constructive expropriation rule. The Court's decision placed a
nation on notice of perceived shortcoming in its course of legal
development, while leaving discretion over developmental
corrections in the able hands of that nation.
It is important to note that the Carbonara Court's model of
deferential protection and instruction is particularly well-suited to
inform domestic legal progression. This is because it is a model
that is capable of gauging the importance of particular legal
changes and of adjusting the frequency of its guidance accordingly.
Under the Carbonara model, laws that are particularly
problematic will likely result in a greater number of decisions by
the Court. Accordingly, the more problematic a domestic law is,
the more vociferous the Court's aggregated message will be.
Excessive circumstantial invalidations and continual directive
criticism will likely encourage relevant nations to progressively
reconstitute problematic laws until such laws clearly comport with
basic human rights. Finally, the model of international
jurisprudence set forth in the Carbonara decision provides the
proper balance of flexibility and persistence necessary to enforce
effectively, human rights within national contexts.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Carbonara was properly restricted to
the facts of the Applicants' case. By invalidating the application of
the constructive expropriation rule with the five-year statute of
69. Carbonara, no. 24638/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-VI 65-66.
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limitations in the Applicants' case, rather than invalidating the
constructive expropriation doctrine in toto, the Court created an
aptly-functioning paradigm of deferential progressivism. Under
this paradigm, domestic, legal evolution is fittingly placed in the
hands of national governments, which are ideally situated to
determine their respective legal needs. While domestic law may
not properly protect individual rights at a given stage of evolution,
the Carbonara Court's decision demonstrated the Court's ability
to protect such rights through the Convention on a circumstantial
basis.
Although the Court was deferential to national autonomy, its
case-specific decision helped put national authorities on notice
regarding the problematic nature of a domestic law. The Court's
ability to enumerate and criticize domestic law in its dicta also
helped put national authorities on notice regarding specific
problems with and potential solutions for a domestic law. Under
the Carbonara Court's paradigm, specific legal invalidations and
critical dicta increase in prevalence relative to the magnitude of
given problems created by respective domestic laws. The
Carbonara decision thus provided a protective and instructive
international, legal framework for domestic, legal evolution. This
formula for nurturing legal development balanced national and
international legal demands against individual human rights in an
amalgamation that can only be described as legal progression.
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